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Abstract 
We use the 2008 global financial crisis as a natural experiment setting to investigate the 
relationship between managerial ability and corporate investment. We find a strong positive 
relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and capital expenditure during the crisis period, 
which remains robust in the presence of a large array of control variables capturing corporate 
governance attributes, executive compensation incentives and CEO characteristics. This 
relationship was prevalent only among firms with CEOs that had general managerial skills, 
rather than firm-specific skills. Our results also show that the positive relationship between 
managerial ability and corporate investment was supported by the capacity of such firms to 
secure greater financing and be less vulnerable to financial constraints during the crisis. 
Finally, we find that, on average, the stock market evaluates crisis-period investments 
positively, yet this effect is evident solely among firms characterized by high pre-crisis 
managerial ability. Overall, the results are consistent with the view that high managerial 
ability helps to mitigate underinvestment problems during a crisis period, which in turn 
increases firm value. 
JEL classification: G01, G30.  
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1.  Introduction 
The impact of managerial ability on firm policies has long been ignored under the 
assumption that managers are largely homogeneous entities, which implies a limited role for 
manager-specific influence on economic outcomes. Only recently have a handful of studies 
challenged this view by recognizing that managers play an economically significant role on 
their firms’ choices and performance (Bamber et al. 2010; Chemmanur et al., 2010; 
Demerjian et al., 2013; Choi et al., 2015; Andreou et al., 2016; Francis et al., 2016). We 
extend this literature by using the 2008 global financial crisis as a natural experiment setting 
to investigate the impact of managerial ability on corporate investment. In addition, we 
scrutinize the nature of managerial ability to acquire insights about the type of ability that has 
the greatest effect on investments. Finally, we explore the relationship of managerial ability 
with corporate financing and firm value respectively.   
Although it could be argued that the relationship between firm managerial ability and 
corporate policy is straightforward, prior findings have often proved contradictory. For 
instance, a stream of literature suggests that more able managers with reputations at stake are 
expected to reject opportunistic rent-seeking actions that harm firm value, since such behavior 
could tarnish their ability and standing as perceived by shareholders and investors (e.g., Fama, 
1980; Kreps et al., 1982; Graham et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). A different stream of 
literature, however, argues that more able managers may decide to pursue such as ill-advised 
investment- or earning- management to preserve their human capital and reputation, despite 
the fact that these actions usually reduce firm value (Malmendier & Tate, 2007; Francis 2008; 
Petrou & Procopiou, 2016). Such mixed evidence indicates that the relationship of managerial 
ability with firm policy and outcomes has not yet reached a consensus. Perhaps, this 
controversy is due to the confounding effects arising from endogeneity problems, whereby 
contemporaneous realizations of both the dependent variable and the explanatory variables in 
question affect each other (Abdallah et al., 2015). 
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In this paper, we circumvent such endogeneity concerns by focusing on the 
relationship between managerial ability and corporate policy during the financial crisis. This 
period is an ideal setting for such an investigation, not only for its recentness and severity, but 
primarily due to its broadly adverse impact on the availability of corporate finance, as well as 
consumers in general (Duchin et al., 2010). Specifically, the extreme market conditions 
characterized by liquidity shortfalls (Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010), along with the uncertainty 
and conservative approach of financial institutions dictating for more internal control, made it 
very difficult for corporations to obtain credit lines and access external capital. At the same 
time, firms faced various exogenously-driven bottlenecks, such as low demand for their 
products, resulting in losses that harmed their capacity to internally generate enough resources 
to finance attractive investments. Such weakened funding capacity created the conditions for 
firms to suffer from underinvestment problems (Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; 
Balakrishnan et al., 2015), which could be detrimental to firm value. Overall, the recent 
financial crisis abruptly changed firms’ environment by causing an exogenous shock on their 
policies. The crisis therefore provides a natural experiment setting, suitable to alleviate 
endogeneity caveats that usually handicap empirical analyses in corporate finance research.  
In this study, we hypothesize that the impact of managerial ability on firms’ corporate 
investment were not only more easily identified during the crisis period, but were also more 
profound in the presence of an exogenous negative shock to the availability of financing 
resources that potentially undermines investments. Accordingly, we expect firms with higher 
pre-crisis managerial ability to have invested more during the crisis period because their 
managers’ ability facilitated greater access to financing resources. In addition, such 
investments should also have been more highly valued by the market because they mitigated 
severe underinvestment problems that emerged during that period.   
To investigate these hypotheses, we use a measure of managerial ability proposed by 
Demerjian et al. (2012). The measure is based on a comparison of managerial efficiency in 
transforming corporate resources to revenue, relative to their industry peers. Managerial 
ability is considered high when managers generate more significant revenue using a given 
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level of resources or, conversely, when they minimize the resources used for a given level of 
revenue. Using this measure, we provide empirical evidence of a strong positive relation 
between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period capital expenditure. The results remain 
robust even at the inclusion of additional control variables relating to corporate governance 
attributes, executive compensation incentives and CEO characteristics.  
Despite the financial crisis being exogenous, capable of mitigating endogeneity, for 
robustness purposes, we also use a propensity score matching (PSM) approach to ensure that 
our results are not driven by different characteristics between firms with high or low 
managerial ability. This treatment controls for the possibility that certain firm attributes 
simultaneously affect managerial ability and crisis-period investments. The results of PSM 
lend further credence to our main finding regarding the positive relationship between pre-
crisis managerial ability and crisis-period corporate investment. 
Further, we examine the types of managerial ability that seem to withstand distressed 
times, shedding light on the growing importance of general versus firm-specific managerial 
skills (Custodio et al., 2013; Brockman et al., 2016). We find that the positive relationship 
between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period investments is prevalent only among 
firms with CEOs who have general managerial skills (i.e. generalists) rather than firm-
specific skills (i.e. specialists). Additionally, we find a positive relationship between pre-crisis 
managerial ability and crisis-period financing resources. Thus, an important channel through 
which managerial ability affects investments is by facilitating financing. Finally, we 
document that the stock market highly valued the crisis-period investments only when these 
were made by firms with high pre-crisis managerial ability. 
This study contributes to the literature as follows. First, our results show positive 
valuation of capital expenditure during the crisis period for firms with high pre-crisis 
managerial ability, whereby firms with low pre-crisis managerial ability experienced negative 
valuation of investments. This finding contributes to the extant literature (e.g., Graham et al., 
2013; Falato et al., 2015; Malmendier and Tate, 2007; Francis, 2008) by shedding light on the 
differential way that managerial ability impacts firm value and helps to settle the conflicting 
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conjectures as debated in prior studies. Second, we contribute to recent studies that investigate 
how firms managed liquidity shortfalls in their effort to mitigate underinvestment problems 
following the onset of the crisis (e.g., Campello et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010; Campello et 
al., 2011). Our findings suggest that higher managerial ability contributed to the capacity of 
firms to secure more financing during the crisis, which in turn enabled them to pursue more 
investment opportunities. In this respect, high managerial ability appears to offset crisis-
period underinvestment problems that in turn enhanced firm value. Finally, we contribute to 
the burgeoning literature that highlights the importance of general versus firm-specific skills 
with respect to CEO pay (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Custodio et al., 2013; Brockman 
et al., 2016). Our results reveal that generalist, not specialist, CEOs mitigate underinvestment 
at times of constrained economic conditions. In this vein, our findings provide an economic 
explanation of why generalist CEOs earn significantly higher salaries compared to their 
specialist peers.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the literature 
review and the arguments of the study. Section 3 includes the sample and data measurement, 
Section 4, the statistical methodology and empirical results. Section 5 provides a conclusion. 
2. Background on managerial ability, corporate policies and outcomes 
Recent literature has investigated whether managerial characteristics and 
competencies such as ability, talent, quality or reputation influence corporate decision-
making. Starting with Bertrand and Schoar (2003), a significant extent of the heterogeneity in 
investment, financial, and organizational practices of firms is shown to be explained by 
managers’ fixed effects. Chang et al. (2010) link variations in management actions and styles 
to variations in firm performance, consistent with the view that differences in firm 
performance may also stem from managers’ traits or experiences. This view is also supported 
by Chemmanur and Paeglis (2005), Chemmanur et al. (2009) and Switzer and Bourdon 
(2011) who document positive relations between firm management quality and IPO/SEO 
performance. In addition, Chemmanur et al. (2010) find value-enhancing anti-takeover 
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provisions in the presence of higher quality firm management. In the banking industry, 
Andreou et al. (2016) demonstrate that more able bank managers have the capacity to handle 
higher risks and to facilitate greater intermediation. Finally, Francis et al. (2016) show that 
firms with higher ability managers obtain more favorable loan contract terms, such as lower 
loan spreads, less stringent covenants, and longer term maturity. Overall, the literature 
demonstrates the importance of managerial ability on firm policies and outcomes.   
More able managers  tend to be, inter alia, more knowledgeable about their business, 
leading to better judgments and estimates about product demand, a better understanding of 
technology and industry trends and a more efficient management of their employees 
(Demerjian et al., 2012, 2013). Therefore, firms with higher managerial ability are expected 
to align resources well with the environment in which they operate, resulting in greater 
internal profitability. This is particularly important in the presence of growth opportunities, 
since it can facilitate a continuum of investments, especially if these firms face difficulties in 
raising external finance.
1
  
Perhaps the most prominent channel through which managerial ability affects firm 
policy is through the reputational capital that managers accumulate over the course of their 
career. When financing investment opportunities through internal profitability is not adequate, 
the reputational capital of more able managers is relied upon to access external financing for 
the firm; for instance, through sustained negotiations and dealings with market participants 
(Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2009). Higher managerial ability can 
therefore act as a guarantee, as it vouches for a firm’s quality to outside markets, thus 
achieving a lesser cost of capital due to a reduction in information asymmetry between firm 
insiders and outside markets regarding firm value (Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005). A 
reduction in information asymmetry allows creditors to anticipate future performance and 
                                                          
1
 Campello et al. (2010) report that during the financial crisis, 86% of US firms facing financial 
constraints bypassed attractive investments due to difficulties in raising external finance, compared to 
44% of financially unconstrained firms that did the same. Also, they report that more than half of US 
firms rely on internally-generated cash flows to fund investment under financially constrained 
circumstances, and 56% of constrained firms are found to cancel investment projects when they are 
unable to obtain external funds, compared to 31% of unconstrained firms that may cancel investment. 
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more accurately evaluate the probability of default states, which translates into a lower price 
of debt and more flexible contract terms such as maturity, limitations on covenants, or 
collateral requirements (Aivazian, et al., 2010; Francis, et al., 2016). Together with their 
perceived ability to better resolve agency issues (Chemmanur, et al., 2009), more able 
managers inspire credibility in the eyes of creditors and other stakeholders in general. 
Credibility is important, especially during financial crises, as such periods intensify friction in 
external capital markets. Such friction hinders a firm’s capacity to acquire capital to pursue 
investment projects (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1999), resulting in 
underinvestment; not so, however, for firms with more able managers, which manage to 
overcome such friction. Therefore, firms with higher managerial ability should have better 
chances to access external financing such as loans and achieve lower loan rates or less 
stringent non-price contract terms, lowering in this way the financing cost of their 
investments. 
Overall, we hypothesize that firms with higher managerial ability were likely to have 
a larger scale of corporate investment during the crisis period, due to greater access to 
financing resources, mitigating in this respect underinvestment problems which, in turn, 
enhances firm value.  
3. Data and variables 
3.1. Data  
To construct our dependent variables, we obtain data from the COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
merged database for the fiscal year 2008. According to Duchin et al. (2010), and Balakrishnan 
et al. (2015), the crisis period lasted from August 1, 2007 to August 31, 2009. During that 
period, there was an abnormally high LIBOR-OIS spread, which caused loan spreads to 
skyrocket, consistent with the view that the financial crisis exogenously tightened firms’ 
access to finance. Therefore, the fiscal year 2008, residing somewhere in the middle of the 
abovementioned dates, serves to represent the period of crisis. We then link our crisis-period-
dependent variables with two measures of managerial ability estimated before the onset of the 
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crisis (i.e., up to the end of the fiscal year 2006); estimating ability during the pre-crisis 
period ensures that our measure is not affected by consequences arising from the crisis. The 
sample on which we can secure an estimate of managerial ability measures features 2,748 
firms, however, depending on the regression model, we ultimately use less data, due to 
missing observations around the control variables, specifically around firm characteristics, 
corporate governance attributes and CEO characteristics/executive compensation incentives. 
Corporate governance attributes and CEO education information are collected from BoardEx, 
while executive compensation and other CEO characteristics data are collected from 
Execucomp. To lessen the influence of outliers, we winsorize the continuous variables at the 
1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles.   
3.2 Variable definitions and measurement  
In this section, we describe the measurement of the three sets of variables used to 
empirically test our baseline models, specifically: (i) dependent variables, i.e., investments, 
financing and firm value, (ii) independent variables, i.e., managerial ability, and (iii) main 
control variables relating to firm-level characteristics. Detailed variable definitions can be 
found in the Appendix. 
3.2.1. Dependent variables 
We use different dependent variables that cover the three main areas examined in the 
study: investments, financing and firm value. We measure crisis-period corporate investment 
(CRISIS_INVESTMENT) with capital expenditures divided by beginning of the year net 
assets, while crisis-period firm value is measured using Tobin’s Q (CRISIS_Q), defined as 
market value of equity,  plus total debt, plus preferred stock liquidating value, minus deferred 
taxes and investment tax credits, all deflated by the book-value of assets. For financing 
resources we employ three measures. First, crisis-period cash flow (CRISIS_CF) is defined as 
operating income before depreciation, deflated by beginning of the year stockholder equity. 
Second, crisis-period total resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES) are defined as the difference 
between the issuance of long-term debt and long-term debt reduction, plus operating 
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activities, all deflated by beginning of the year net assets. Third, a crisis-period financial 
constraints index (CRISIS_FINCON) is defined as in the Whited and Wu (2006) study, which 
is based on firm characteristics associated with external finance constraints and, as such, 
reflects the severity of liquidity constraints faced by each firm in our sample during the crisis 
period.  
3.2.2 Independent variable: managerial ability  
The managerial ability measures are derived from the method proposed by Demerjian 
et al. (2012).
2
 This measurement of managerial ability captures the ability of firm managers to 
produce more revenue while using either the same or even fewer resources than their peers in 
the same industry. Demerjian et al. (2012) use data envelopment analysis (DEA) to model 
firm efficiency, following a two-step procedure to quantify managerial ability. The first step 
requires the estimation of firm efficiency scores defined as the ratio of outputs over inputs 
using the following DEA optimization problem: 
𝐷𝐸𝐴 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓:   𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑣𝜃 =  
∑ 𝑢𝑖
𝑠
𝑖=1 𝑦𝑖𝑘
∑ 𝑣𝑗𝑥𝑗𝑘
𝑚
𝑗=1
, 𝑘 = 1, … 𝑛                           (1) 
In Eq. (1), s are the outputs, m are the inputs, n is the number of firms, while u and v represent 
the respective weight for the outputs and inputs, which is necessary to calculate the firm 
efficiency score. Following the rationale of Demerjian et al. (2012), the output variable used 
in Eq. (1) is sales, whereas the input variables are: net property, plant and equipment, net 
operating leases, net research and development, purchased goodwill, other intangible assets, 
cost of inventory, as well as, general, selling and administrative expenses. These inputs all 
contribute to the generation of revenue and are affected by managerial ability, as each input is 
subject to managerial discretion. The solution to the above optimization problem results in an 
efficient frontier that measures the amount and mix of resources used to generate revenue by 
firms within each industry. Firms operating on the frontier are assigned a score of one and the 
                                                          
2
 Our implementation follows the estimations in Demerjian et al. (2012) exactly. Therefore, in this 
section we provide a brief discussion of how we measure managerial ability. Further details on the 
implementation of this method can be found in the original article.    
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least efficient firms are assigned a score of zero; the lower the firm’s score, the further away it 
is from the frontier. 
As theorized by Demerjian et al. (2012), firm efficiency scores are affected by both 
firm-specific factors and management ability. Therefore, the second step purges the effect of 
key firm-specific characteristics, which may aid or hinder manager ability, by regressing the 
DEA efficiency scores (𝐷𝐸𝐴 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓) on firm size, market share, positive free cash flows, firm 
age, number of segments and a foreign currency indicator. Demerjian et al. (2012) estimate 
the following Tobit regression model per industry: 
𝐷𝐸𝐴 − 𝐸𝑓𝑓 =  𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝑎2𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 + 𝑎3𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒_𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ_𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 
         𝑎4 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚_𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝑎5𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟_𝑜𝑓_𝑆𝑒𝑔𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝑎6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛_𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦_𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 
         𝑎7𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑_𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 + 𝑅𝐸𝑆_𝐸𝐹𝐹.                                                                                     (2) 
In regression Eq. (2), the residual term (RES_EFF) captures the effect of firm efficiency 
attributed to managerial ability. Hence, our first measure of managerial ability, denoted as 
RES_EFF_2006, is the residual term of Eq. (2) using data exclusively from the fiscal year 
2006. We also estimate an alternative managerial ability measure, denoted as RES_EFF_AV, 
by using the per-firm average value of RES_EFF with data from the fiscal years 2002 to 
2006. As shown in Table 1, which describes the summary statistics of our main variables, the 
mean (median) values of RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV are -0.005 (-0.042) and -0.017           
(-0.065) respectively, all close to the value of -0.004 (-0.013) reported by Demerjian et al. 
(2012). The standard deviations of RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV are respectively 0.257 
and 0.263, which are higher than the value of 0.149 reported by Demerjian et al. (2012). We 
attribute this discrepancy to the difference in the sample size between the two studies. 
Specifically, Demerjian et al. (2012) employ 177,134 observations sampled from 1980 to 
2009, which is a significantly bigger data set compared to ours. Due to statistical reasons, it is 
natural to observe a much lower standard deviation in their case. 
We deem this managerial ability measurement approach suitable for our 
investigation, as it reflects the ability of managers to generate revenue through efficient 
exploration of resources through decisions and choices encompassing capital, labor, 
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investment, and other revenue-generating practices. In this respect, higher-ability firms are 
those with more able managers who are knowledgeable of their business in terms of cost and 
revenue drivers, and have better skill attributes and superior judgment in anticipating future 
changes compared to their less able peers. Therefore, the choice of the managerial ability 
measure for this study is directly linked to the main research questions under investigation 
that reflect access to, and use of, resources in the form of investments to enhance firm value. 
Further, this approach lends credence to our analysis as it enables us to compute managerial 
ability measures for a broader set of firms, including small ones, offering more generalized 
inferences compared to studies that have focused exclusively on certain types of firms and 
specific events (e.g., Chemmanur and Paeglis, 2005; Chemmanur et al., 2009).   
Due to the fact that RES_EFF in Eq. (2) is calculated on a two-step estimation 
approach, it is likely to suffer from random measurement errors that could harm the precision 
of the ability measure and consequently distort statistical inferences. Therefore, to mitigate a 
potential bias in the managerial ability measures, as in the case of Demerjian et al. (2013), we 
independently recode RES_EFF_2006 and RES_EFF_AV into deciles by assigning the value 
of 0 to the decile with the 10% lowest values, the value of 9 to the decile with the 10% 
highest values, while in-between deciles are accordingly assigned values from 1 to 8. The 
categorical definitions of managerial ability are correspondingly denoted as MA and MA_AV.
3
  
Finally, it is important to note that both managerial ability measures utilize 
information from fiscal year 2006 or prior, that is to say at least two years away from the 
time-point we measure our dependent variables. This is a crucial treatment, ensuring that the 
measurement of managerial ability is less likely to be spuriously related to unobserved within-
firm changes in financing and investment policies following the onset of the crisis. The latter 
advantage should be stronger for MA_AV that aggregates (per-firm) information from 2002 to 
                                                          
3
 The recoding of managerial ability from a continuous variable to a categorical one, leads to slightly 
stronger relations with the dependent variables. For example, the correlation coefficient between 
RES_EFF_AV and CRISIS_INVESTMENT is 0.069 (p-value<1%), whereas the correlation coefficient 
between MA_AV and CRISIS_INVESTMENT is 0.071 (p-value<1%). In general, we get slightly higher 
power in our test statistics when using the categorical definition of managerial ability, despite the fact 
that all our statistical inferences and conclusions remain unaltered if we instead use RES_EFF_2006 
and RES_EFF_AV.   
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2006, and therefore it is even less likely to be confounded from effects related to a potential 
anticipation of the crisis. 
3.2.3 Main control variables 
Following prior studies (see Chemmanur et al., 2009; Duchin et al., 2010; 
Balakrishnan et al., 2015, Francis et al., 2016) within the context of our own investigation, we 
control for size, leverage, profitability, cash flow, and growth opportunities to account for 
firm-related heterogeneity that can influence corporate investment and financing 
opportunities, all of them measured in the pre-crisis period (i.e., the fiscal year 2006). 
Specifically, size (SIZE) is defined as the natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of 
equity. Size signals firm quality and power, whereby larger firms may enjoy easier access and 
more favorable financing terms, hence they might have the capacity to carry out more 
investments. Leverage (LEV) is the book value of debt divided by the book value of total 
assets and could account for potential investment distortions and impediments to financing in 
case of over-indebtedness; conversely, leverage may also signal a firm’s stronger corporate 
governance quality, as higher levels of leverage discipline and incentivize managers in 
delivering strong operating performance and high growth in the net assets of the firm. Cash 
flow (CF) is calculated as operating income, before depreciation, deflated by beginning-of-
the-year stockholder equity and used to account for financial slack that could allow for more 
investments that remedy underinvestment problems. Return on equity (ROE) is calculated as 
earnings, before interest and taxes, deflated by beginning-of-the-year net assets and used to 
account for profitability, which enhance the firm’s internal sources of financing allowing for 
more investments. Further, we proxy for growth opportunities using the firm’s market-to-
book ratio (MTB) and stock return performance (RET). MTB is calculated as the market value, 
divided by the book value of equity. Firms with higher MTB values feature richer growth 
opportunity sets, implying higher market expectations for future profitability. Hence, such 
firms may have easier access to external financing in order to make investments. To capture 
growth opportunities and market expectations not reflected in ΜΤΒ, we also consider the 
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firm’s stock return performance (RET), calculated as the 12-month compounded stock return 
(excluding dividends) spanning the fiscal year 2006. Additionally, we account for the firm’s 
asset growth rate (GROWTH), calculated as the difference between the beginning- and end-
of-year total assets deflated by beginning-of-year total assets. A firm featuring greater past 
asset expansion might have exhausted its financial slackness and hence has less capacity to 
access additional financing to offset underinvestment. 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the main variables employed in the empirical 
analysis. These statistics are computed using a sample of 2,583 observations with all available 
information across the variables contained in this table.
4
 In terms of crisis-period investments, 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT has a mean of 0.140 and a standard deviation of 0.258. In terms of the 
various financing resources, CRISIS_CF has a mean (standard deviation) of 0.209 (0.562), 
while the corresponding figures for CRISIS_RESOURCES and CRISIS_FINCON are 0.196 
(0.510) and -0.171 (0.187), respectively. In terms of firm value, CRISIS_Q has a mean of 
2.617 and a standard deviation of 6.872. Finally, in terms of control variables, the mean 
values (standard deviations) for SIZE, MTB, and LEV are 6.435 (2.025), 3.289 (4.003) and 
0.259 (0.285), respectively. Other mean values (standard deviations) are 0.190 (0.413) for 
GROWTH, 0.228 (0.784) for RET, 0.128 (0.508) for ROE and 0.215 (0.598) for CF.   
 [Insert Table 1, here] 
4.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this section, we describe the methodology of our multivariate regression tests and 
discuss the results obtained from investigating the relation between pre-crisis managerial 
ability and crisis-period investments, financing and firm value.
5
 According to our main 
hypothesis, we expect to observe a positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and 
                                                          
4
 In the regression analysis that follows, we only require simultaneous availability for MA and MA_AV, 
therefore certain regression models are estimated using a larger number of observations.  
5
 For the regression analysis, all continuous variables have been standardized to have a mean of 0 and 
standard deviation of 1. Such standardization is useful to avoid potential influences attributed to scaling 
differences. Nevertheless, all results are robust when instead using unstandardized variables. 
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crisis-period corporate investment. This should consequently be echoed on the crisis-period 
firm value.  
4.2.1 Pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis corporate investment  
Table 2 reports the results of the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability (MA, 
MA_AV) and capital expenditures during the crisis (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). The regression 
models include Fama-French 48 industry-fixed effects under the assumption that such 
treatment broadly captures product market competition, which highly correlates with 
corporate governance mechanisms (Giroud & Mueller, 2011). Thus, the inclusion of industry 
dummies can potentially control for disciplining effects on managerial opportunism, which 
correlates with severe agency problems that constitute significant caveats for firms in non-
competitive industries. The regression models also include the abovementioned set of control 
variables. Accordingly, characteristics featuring larger firms, and firms with greater growth 
opportunity sets and higher liquidity supply/slackness should have a positive impact on the 
scale of corporate investment.   
The results in Table 2 show positive and significant relations between the pre-crisis 
managerial ability measures, namely MA (p-value<10%) and MA_AV (p-value<5%), and 
crisis-period investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). These findings lend support to the notion 
that more ably-managed firms made more investments during the crisis and this could act as a 
remedy to underinvestment problems. With regards to the control variables, the coefficients 
of firm size (SIZE), market-to-book (MTB) and leverage (LEV) are positive and statistically 
significant (p-values<5%). Past asset growth rate (GROWTH), stock return performance 
(RET) and cash flows (CF) carry the expected coefficients signs but are not statistically 
significant, mainly because their influence on CRISIS_INVESTMENT is subsumed by the 
other variables.  
[Insert Table 2, here] 
4.2.2 Propensity score analysis 
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If the baseline characteristics of firms managed by more able managers are fundamentally 
different than those of firms managed by less able managers, then the managerial ability 
impact on corporate investment might be a statistical artefact stemming from model 
misspecification. To mitigate any potential non-randomized confounding biases relating to 
either measured or unmeasured baseline characteristics, we follow Andreou et al. (2017) and 
create two data samples using a one-to-one PSM estimation. Based on this method, the 
resulting firm-year observations in each sample are comparable across the control variables, 
with the exception of managerial ability. Specifically, the method consists of a probit 
regression to estimate propensity scores based on the probability of receiving a binary 
treatment conditional on all the control variables. Thus, to operationalize the probit 
regression, we consider firms with more able managers as the treatment. We define more able 
managers using a binary variable based on the median value of pre-crisis managerial ability 
measures (e.g. MA, MA_AV). Then, for each managerial ability measure, we separately 
estimate the probability of firms with more able managers using as independent variables the 
controls included in our baseline models as per Table 2. Finally, for each case where a firm 
has more able managers, we use the propensity scores to find comparable firm observations 
where a firm has less able managers. To do so, we use the nearest-neighbor method along 
with the requirement that the absolute difference of the propensity score among pairs does not 
exceed 0.01. Where there is a concentration of firms with a less able manager that meet this 
criterion, we keep only the firm with the smallest difference in the propensity scores. This 
method yields, respectively, 1,244 and 1,364 unique pairs of matched firms when using MA 
and MA_AV. Panel A (Panel C) of Table 3 reports difference-in-means of the control 
variables for firms with more and less able managers for both the unmatched and matched 
samples when the treatment effect is based on MA (MA_AV).  As expected, the corresponding 
difference-in-means show that some control variables differ statistically for the unmatched 
sample. Nevertheless, the difference-in-means become statistically insignificant for the 
matched sample, consistent with the view that the propensity score matching approach 
succeeds in making the sample of firms with more able managers comparable to the sample of 
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firms with less able managers. Based on these matched samples, we re-run the regression 
models of Table 2 using MA and MA_AV, respectively, as main variables of interest. The 
results in Panels B and D of Table 3 show positive and significant relations between MA (p-
value<10%), MA_AV (p-value<1%) and crisis-period investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT).  
Overall, the PSM results continue to demonstrate that pre-crisis managerial ability 
has a strong positive relation with crisis-period corporate investments, lending further 
credence to the results obtained in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 3, here] 
4.2.3 Additional controls 
The analysis in this subsection investigates the robustness of the main finding at the 
inclusion of a large array of corporate governance and CEO-related controls. Such an 
investigation is motivated by previous literature that documents links between firm policies 
with corporate governance (e.g., Harford et al., 2012) and CEO characteristics (e.g., Bertrand 
and Schoar, 2003, Chemmanur & Paeglis, 2005). If the positive effect of pre-crisis managerial 
ability on the scale of corporate investment is due to stronger governance structures or 
managerial traits, then we would expect this effect to diminish considerably (or even vanish) 
when such controls are included in the regression analysis. 
We scrutinize the importance of corporate governance by augmenting our main 
regression models with corporate governance variables and retaining all other explanatory 
variables. Particularly, we incorporate the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) index (GIM), 
which proxies for the balance of power between shareholders and managers, board size 
(BOARD_SIZE) to control for the effects of larger boards on investment levels, board 
independence (BOARD_INDEP) as an indication of superior governance, as well as stock 
(INC_STOCKS) and option (INC_OPTIONS) compensation incentives to account for the 
degree of alignment of executive incentives with shareholder interests as a direct way to 
mitigate agency problems.
6
 We expect firms with lower GIM indices, smaller board sizes, 
                                                          
6
 These variables are all defined in the Appendix of this paper. 
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higher proportions of independent directors, as well as more incentivized CEOs in terms of 
compensation, to maintain superior governance structures (Hoechle et al., 2012).  
Along with the corporate governance controls, our analysis also considers the effects 
of certain managerial characteristics. We include a proxy where a CEO’s formal power is 
defined as a dummy that equals one when the CEO also serves as chairman of the board 
(CEO_DUALITY). We also include the natural logarithm of the CEO’s age (CEO_AGE) and 
the natural logarithm of the CEO’s tenure (CEO_TENURE) to proxy for the CEO's risk-
taking and investment behavior. Much like the inclusion of corporate governance variables, 
we would expect pre-crisis managerial ability to have less impact on crisis-period investments 
in the presence of: (i) powerful CEOs, since they have discretionary authority to 
opportunistically engage in additional investments for servicing their risk-preferences (e.g., 
Kim et al., 2009; Aktas et al., 2017), (ii) older CEOs consistent with the view that risk-taking 
behavior pertaining to certain corporate policies decreases as CEOs become older (Serfling, 
2013, Andreou et al., 2017), and (iii) shorter tenures, as CEOs become more conservative as 
their tenure lengthens, an important factor, which may influence CEOs to adapt less to their 
external environment and limit their appetite to take more investments (e.g., Miller, 1991; 
McClelland et al., 2012). 
Model (1) of Panels A and B in Table 4 shows the regression results after the 
inclusion of additional corporate governance variables. Results maintain positive and 
significant coefficients (p-value<1%) for both measures of managerial ability (MA, MA_AV). 
A similar positive relation is shown in model (2), where the regression model controls for 
CEO characteristics. When all corporate governance and CEO characteristics controls are 
added in model (3), we still observe a strong positive and significant (p-value<1%) relation 
between both measures of pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period corporate investment.  
Overall, we can conclude that the impact of managerial ability on investments is 
distinct and remains robust at the inclusion of other variables that feature corporate 
governance and CEO characteristics.  
[Insert Table 4, here] 
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4.2.4 Types of managerial ability and crisis investments  
Since the measure of managerial ability is generic, capturing a broader notion of 
manager impact on firm operational effectiveness, it would be beneficial to delve into the 
varying types of managerial ability that appear to be more influential within the setting of our 
analysis. Custodio et al. (2013) argue that general managerial skills have recently become 
more important than firm-specific skills. Firms and their respective boards show an 
inclination to outside hires, reflecting a shift in the relative importance of general versus 
specific human capital chosen for executive positions. These facts are substantiated by the 
premium that tends to be paid to generalist CEOs who have accumulated general managerial 
capital that is transferrable across firms and industries, rather than specialist CEOs, whose 
human capital is firm-specific (Custodio et al., 2013; Brockman et al., 2016). 
We investigate whether our main inferences from Table 2 hold true across the array 
of skill type. We therefore utilize the general ability index as in Custodio et al. (2013) that 
classifies CEOs as either generalists or specialists, to investigate the types of managerial skills 
that matter most in corporate investment during the financial crisis. It is important to note 
that, while in Demerjian et al. (2012) the ability score is attributed to the management team, 
the general ability measure by Custodio et al. (2013) is attributed only to the CEO; the 
reasoning here is that the CEO is considered the most influential personality in corporate 
decision-making and the one who, on average, most likely impacts corporate investment (Fee 
and Hadlock 2003; Demerjian et al. 2012).
7
  
The general ability index is based on the lifetime work experience of CEOs in 
publicly traded firms prior to their present CEO position, focusing, as mentioned, upon 
transferrable, rather than firm-specific, skills. Custodio et al. (2013) consider five aspects of 
general managerial ability: (i) number of previous positions in the CEO’s career, to examine 
                                                          
7
 Demerjian,et al. (2012) find that 60.5% of their CEO fixed-effects within the period 1992-2009 are 
important indicators of managerial ability after controlling for firm fixed effects. They argue that these 
results indicate that the managerial ability measure reflects, to a large extent, the CEO’s impact on firm 
organizational output. In our sample, we revisit their approach to observe a CEO-fixed-effects 
explanatory power of about 67%. This evidence suggests that the managerial ability measures we use 
are highly attributed to the decision-making of the CEO.  
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the exposure of the CEO to different organizational fields such as production, finance, sales, 
etc; (ii) number of firms at which the CEO has been previously employed; (iii) number of 
previous industries, to identify the degree of the CEO’s exposure to different business 
environments; (iv) previous positions of the CEO at various firms which could be viewed as 
an indicator of skills allowing the CEO to internally manage these firms and externally 
maintain the appropriate strategies for all stakeholders involved; and (v) past work experience 
in a conglomerate firm, which serves as a generic skill enhancer of management in complex 
and multi-industry settings. The index of general managerial ability is derived as the first 
factor of principal components analysis of these five dimensions, deriving a one-dimensional 
index of general managerial ability, with more weight attributed to those components that 
more precisely represent the general skills of a CEO; specifically, equal weight is assigned to 
the number of previous positions, firms, and industries, and a lower weight is assigned to the 
previous positions as CEO and conglomerate experience. The index is estimated by applying 
the scores of each proxy to the standardized general ability components, and is normalized to 
have a mean equal to zero and a standard deviation equal to one. This construction of a 
composite measure from the five variables helps to avoid problems arising from 
multicollinearity and measurement errors. The five variables are positively correlated with the 
index, indicating that higher values of the index reflect greater general human capital.  
In Table 5, model (1) re-examines the relation between the two measures of 
managerial ability (Panel A for MA and Panel B for MA_AV) and crisis investments 
(CRISIS_INVESTMENT) for the sample in which the general ability index is available. In 
support of Table’s 2 findings, these results also show that pre-crisis managerial ability is, in 
both measures, significant (p-values<5%) and positively related to crisis-period investments. 
We then investigate the effect of the types of managerial ability on this relation, whereby the 
relation is re-examined based on whether the CEO is classified as a specialist (observations 
with values below the median general ability scores) in model (2) or as a generalist 
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(observations with values above the median general ability scores) in model (3).
8
 Overall, the 
results show that the positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis 
investments is statistically significant only in model (3) of Panels A and B, which refers to 
firms run by generalist CEOs (p-value<1% for MA and p-value<5% for MA_AV). It appears 
that generalist CEOs may be the best match in distressed times, as general knowledge and 
skills are an important dimension of CEO ability during such times. This finding adds to the 
work by Custodio et al. (2013) by providing further evidence of the growing importance of 
general versus firm-specific skills in the CEO market, particularly in periods when firms face 
several challenges, such as liquidity shortfalls and underinvestment problems. 
[Insert Table 5, here] 
4.2.5 Additional analysis on the types of managerial ability 
Following a similar line of reasoning as for the analysis in Table 4, we investigate 
whether the above positive relation between managerial ability and investment that is 
prevalent only for generalist CEOs remains robust at the inclusion of additional controls. In 
Table 6, models (1) to (3) report the results for the sample of specialist CEOs, while models 
(4) to (6) report the results for the sample of generalist CEOs. Models (1) and (4) include 
corporate governance control variables, namely GIM index, board size (BOARD_SIZE), board 
independence (BOARD_INDEP), as well as executive stock (INC_STOCKS) and option 
(INC_OPTIONS) compensation incentives. For both managerial ability measures (Panels A 
and B), the results of model (1) show that the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability 
and crisis-period investments is insignificant for the sample of specialist CEOs. Conversely, 
the results in model (4) show that both measures are significant (p-value<1%) and positively 
related to the scale of corporate investment for the sample of generalist CEOs. Hence, 
generalist CEOs help to increase investments during distressed times even after taking into 
account corporate governance attributes. The same pattern appears in models (2) and (5) 
when CEO-level characteristics, namely age (CEO_AGE), tenure (CEO_TENURE), duality 
(CEO_DUALITY) and education (CEO_EDU) are included as control variables in the 
                                                          
8
 This classification follows Custodio et al. (2013). 
21 
 
models.
9
 The ability of CEOs with more general managerial skills to increase investments 
during crisis periods is again robust at the inclusion of CEO-level characteristics. The same 
conclusions can be reached even when all corporate governance and CEO characteristics are 
combined together, as they are in models (3) and (6).  
Overall, after the inclusion of a large array of corporate governance and CEO-related 
characteristics, the results in Table 6 continue to show a strong positive relationship between 
pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period investments that is prevalent only among firms 
with CEOs that have general (rather than firm-specific) managerial skills. 
[Insert Table 6, here] 
We also perform additional robustness checks on the abovementioned relations. In 
Table 7, we use alternative measures to categorize between generalist vs. specialist CEOs. 
Using detailed data on the educational background of CEOs, we classify CEOs based on their 
highest educational degree. First, we conduct a test by dividing the data into the sample of 
CEOs who hold a PhD (i.e., specialists) and those that do not (i.e., generalists). Second, we 
conduct an additional test on whether the CEO holds any general postgraduate education 
degrees; thus, we divide the data into the sample of CEOs who have been awarded an MBA 
and/or a CPA degree (i.e., generalists) and all others who have specific postgraduate degrees 
(i.e., specialists).
10
 Our reasoning in utilizing the educational background to characterize a 
CEO as a specialist or generalist concerns the fact that education is considered to affect 
managerial decision-making (e.g., Bertrand and Schoar, 2003). In this vein, for example, 
CEOs with PhDs can be regarded as individuals with skills which can be characterized as 
more firm-specific, as they can process specific information and make better decisions for 
specialized business/scientific-related issues. On the contrary, CEOs with MBA and/or CPA 
                                                          
9
 We include CEO education as an extra managerial characteristic for this analysis that relies on a 
sample with available observations for the generalist-specialist skills. We deem this additional control 
variable necessary as variations in CEO educational background might be driving the strong positive 
relationship that is observed for the sample of generalists. CEO_EDU takes the value of 0 when the 
CEO has no university education, the value of 1 when the CEO has a bachelor’s, the value of 2 when 
the CEO also holds a master’s and a value of 3 when the CEO holds a PhD.    
10
 CEOs that hold a PhD are always classified as specialists despite any other postgraduate degree(s) 
they may hold.  
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degrees can be regarded as individuals with more likely generic skills, who can more easily 
process information pertaining to factors such as investing, financing, forecasting, etc., 
allowing them to make better and sharper decisions in the context of evolving and highly 
turbulent market conditions. 
In Table 7, models (1) to (6) report estimates for regression models of 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT when the CEO is classified as a specialist or a generalist based on 
whether they hold a PhD. To maintain consistency with previous analyses, we also 
incorporate controls of corporate governance and CEO-level characteristics. Similarly to our 
findings in Table 6, regression coefficients for both managerial ability measures emerge as 
insignificant in models (1) to (3) for the sample in which the CEO is classified as a specialist 
(under the heading “CEO holds a PhD”). Conversely, for the sample in which the CEO is 
classified as a generalist (under the heading “CEO does not hold a PhD”), regression models 
(4) to (6) evince a positive and significant relation between the two measures and 
investments. The same patterns continue to hold true for the specific vs. general education 
subsample analysis in models (7) to (12), which ascertain the robustness of our findings. 
Overall, the results confirm that a generalist CEO is the type of manager whose ability was 
most influential for the scale of corporate investment during the financial crisis.  
[Insert Table 7, here] 
4.2.6 Pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis period financing 
  Duchin et al. (2010) argue that corporate investment declined significantly 
following the onset of the crisis, and this decline appears to be greatest for firms with low 
cash reserves or high-net short-term debt, with high financing frictions, or in industries which 
are heavily dependent on external finance. If higher ability managers were more capable in 
mitigating underinvestment during the crisis, then one important conjecture to be made is that 
more ably-managed firms should also be able to mitigate the impact of negative shocks on the 
supply of internal and external finance, thus preserving the firm’s capacity to carry out 
corporate investment. Further, more ably-managed firms convey trust and credibility to 
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external markets and thus deal with fewer financial constraints and a greater supply of 
external funds; however, more ably-managed firms might have less need to raise funds 
externally if they generate internally-sufficient cash flows to undertake attractive investments 
during the crisis. 
To examine these arguments, we investigate the relation between pre-crisis 
managerial ability and crisis-period financing resources as captured by cash flows 
(CRISIS_CF), total financing resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES) and financial constraints 
(CRISIS_FINCON). Table 8 presents regression results of the relation between the pre-crisis 
managerial ability (MA, MA_AV) and the aforementioned financing measures. As before, the 
regression models include our main control variables measured at the end of the fiscal year 
2006, as well as industry fixed effects. Moreover, it is reasonable to posit that more able 
managers are better at anticipating future changes in their firm’s underlying economic 
conditions (Trueman, 1986). This means that more able managers may foresee an upcoming 
financial crisis and build precautionary cash reserves or secure additional credit lines which 
can be used to fund investments during a crisis. To control for this possibility in our tests, 
which could otherwise create a mechanical relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and 
crisis-period financing, we include the pre-crisis period value (measured in fiscal year 2006) 
of each dependent variable under investigation, namely CF, RESOURCES and FINCON, 
respectively. Further, since information asymmetry between the firm and external capital 
markets may affect the relation between managerial ability and financing, we report 
regression results that control for the number of analysts following the firm (NUM_ANAL), 
calculated as the natural logarithm of one, plus the number of analysts following the firm in 
the fiscal year 2006, as well as the standard deviation of daily returns during the fiscal year 
2006 (RET_STD). High information asymmetry may impede the capacity of the firm to attract 
external financing, thus an inverse relation is expected between NUM_ANAL and RET_STD 
and total financing resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES), while a positive relation is anticipated 
between these variables and financial constraints (CRISIS_FINCON). 
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Models (1) and (2) in Table 8 present the relation between managerial ability and 
CRISIS_CF. Findings for model (1) evince that both measures of pre-crisis managerial ability 
are positively related to crisis cash flows (p-values<1%), and the results maintain their 
statistical significance when controlling for information asymmetry in model (2). It seems 
that, in the presence of high pre-crisis managerial ability, firms managed to internally 
generate more cash flow during the crisis. With regards to the coefficient of the crisis period 
cash flow variable, CF, it emerges as positive and significant (p-value<5%) supporting that 
firms with strong internal financial positions prior the crisis continued generating higher 
crisis-period internal resources. The two measures of pre-crisis information asymmetry appear 
weakly related to crisis cash flows, a behavior that is expected since information asymmetry 
is a problem primarily affecting the credibility the firm signals to its external markets. 
In model (3), pre-crisis managerial ability is again positive and significant (p-
values<1%) in relation to total financing resources (CRISIS_RESOURCES), and remains 
significant after the inclusion of information asymmetry controls as shown in model (4). 
These results provide strong empirical evidence that firms with higher pre-crisis managerial 
ability have higher levels of financing resources during the crisis. Overall, these findings 
complement Chemmanur et al. (2009) who support that superior managerial quality results in 
the accurate disclosure to the markets regarding true future cash flow and firm performance, 
thus attaining easier access to financing resources. Higher managerial ability conveys the 
intrinsic value of the firm more credibly to outsiders and reduces information frictions, thus 
achieving higher levels of external fund raising even in times where this is hard to attain. The 
positive and significant coefficient of the pre-crisis total resources variable (RESOURCES) 
confirms that crisis total resources are significantly larger for firms with higher total resources 
before the onset of the crisis. Further, in model (4) and according to our expectations, 
RET_STD is negative and significant to crisis-period total resources.  
We also examine the relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and the severity of 
liquidity constraints during the financial crisis as proxied by the Whited and Wu (2006) 
financial constraints index (CRISIS_FINCON). Results in model (5) reveal a strong negative 
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relation between managerial ability and financial constraints, which is also robust to 
additional information asymmetry controls as in model (6). The more able a firm’s managers, 
the less the firm suffers from financial constraints, substantiating the results of previous 
models. The positive and significant relation between pre-crisis financial constraints 
(FINCON) to crisis-period financial constraints (CRISIS_FINCON) verify that already-
constrained firms were most likely further constrained during the crisis. 
Overall, the results in Table 8 suggest that higher managerial ability immunized firms 
against adverse negative liquidity shocks caused by the financial crisis. Our findings confirm 
that more able managers had greater availability of financing necessary to enable them to 
support the increased investments they undertook during the crisis period. 
[Insert Table 8, here] 
4.2.7 Managerial ability and firm value 
As previously discussed, more ably managed firms undertook more investments as 
they appeared to have greater access to financing resources during the crisis period. Yet, the 
act of increasing investments does not necessarily imply conducting more value-enhancing 
investments. Therefore, to gain more insight, we examine the valuation effects of the 
increased investment activity carried out by high-ability managers. 
The regression models in Table 9 are intended to capture the effects of crisis-period 
investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) on firm value as measured by crisis-period Tobin’s Q 
(CRISIS_Q). The following variables are additionally included in the models along with the 
main controls as used in previous regression models: (i) R&D (RD) defined as the research 
and development expense in the fiscal year 2006 divided by beginning of the year net assets 
to proxy for discretionary investments in the realm of CEO power which might have value-
relevance (Lev and Sougiannis, 1996), and (ii) capital expenditure investments made in the 
fiscal year 2006 (INVEST) to capture potential crisis-period valuation effects emanating from 
past investments. Under an agency view, more able managers who have their reputation at 
stake are expected to avoid opportunistic rent-seeking actions that harm firm value; in that 
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respect, discretionary investments conducted by low ability managers would diminish firm 
value, whereas such investments undertaken by high ability managers would enhance value. 
In few of the models we further include controls for corporate governance (GIM) and equity- 
(INC_STOCKS) and option- (INC_OPTIONS) related incentives. Stronger corporate 
governance and better compensation alignment to shareholder interest should be positively 
related to crisis-period firm value.  
[Insert Table 9, here] 
In model (1) of Table 9, we find that crisis investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) have 
a significantly positive effect (p-value<1%) on crisis firm value (CRISIS_Q). There is 
evidence that, on average, the market valued investments made during the financial crisis 
highly. In model (2), we control for corporate governance and executive compensation 
incentives and find that results still show a strong positive relation (p-value<1%) between 
crisis-period investments and firm value.  
In models (3) and (4), we use MA to divide the available sample between low versus 
high pre-crisis managerial ability firms. We do this to examine the effect of crisis investments 
on firm value based on whether these investments are a result of inferior or superior 
managerial ability.
11
 Firms with pre-crisis managerial ability values below the median are 
classified as low-ability (LOWMA) firms, whereas firms with pre-crisis managerial ability 
values above the median are classified as high-ability (HIGHMA) firms. The results show 
that for the sample of LOWMA firms there is a strong negative relation (p-value<1%) 
between crisis investments (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) and firm value (CRISIS_Q); it seems that 
the market did not value investments made by low-ability firms during the crisis. This is 
perhaps the outcome of bad and/or unprofitable investments made by low-ability managers, 
which are not of value to the market. This finding is not surprising and squares with 
managers’ career and reputation concerns in the labor market as outlined in Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990), who posit that, under distressed financial conditions where they cannot utilize 
                                                          
11
 Alternatively, using MA_AV to separate firms into low and high managerial ability also gives 
identical results. 
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their private information, managers display a type of herding behavior, choosing to mimic the 
investment decisions of other (more able) managers. Another explanation for this negative 
value effect is managers’ failure to optimally downsize, especially when the market expects 
low-ability managers to have shrunk their existing operations by reducing crisis-period 
investments. Such explanation gains merit given that low managerial ability implies low 
managerial capacity to accurately foresee and estimate economic conditions and market 
expectations (e.g., Trueman, 1986, Baik et al., 2011, Demerjian, et al., 2013).  
Conversely, for the sample of HIGHMA firms, CRISIS_INVESTMENT is positively 
and significantly related (p-value<1%) to CRISIS_Q. This finding reflects that more able 
managers do not bow to opportunistic rent-seeking actions and are prudent in picking high-
quality investments that eventually enhance firm value (e.g., Fama, 1980; Kreps et al., 1982, 
Graham et al., 2013; Falato et al., 2015). Such investment decision-making also reflects the 
intentions and capacity of high-ability managers to further strengthen their perceived 
reputation and human capital during highly distressed times.  
Overall, these findings provide a scope on the role of managerial ability during the 
financial crisis, which complements the work of Campello et al. (2009) and Duchin et al. 
(2010), among others, who find that managers let slip profitable investment opportunities 
during the crisis as a result of external financing constraints. Managerial ability is however an 
important driver of corporate investment activity and a channel through which more able 
managers enhance firm value. 
5. Conclusions and implications 
This study investigates the effect of pre-crisis managerial ability on corporate policies 
and value during the recent financial crisis. We primarily document a positive and robust 
relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period corporate investment. In an 
attempt to gain more insight into the types of managerial ability most effective during the 
crisis, we provide evidence that managers with general skills (versus managers with firm-
specific skills) were driving their firms’ scale of corporate investment. Additionally, we 
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provide evidence of a positive relation between pre-crisis managerial ability and crisis-period 
financing. Finally, the increased crisis-period investment activity is mediated on market 
valuation, evincing strong positive relations between the levels of investment undertaken by 
high managerial ability individuals and firm value.   
Overall, the findings of our study suggest that managerial ability  is a crucial 
dimension of firm quality and performance during the crisis period. We propose that a firm’s 
managerial ability is useful to curtail underinvestment problems through gaining access to 
more resources that enhance firm value. Consequently, in light of our results, assuming that 
there is homogeneity in the managerial factor, as in the case of several past studies, should be 
considered problematic; instead, understanding the impact of managerial ability on firm 
policies and economic outcomes is fundamental, especially at times when the firm is 
financially distressed, that is suffering from liquidity shortages and harsh finance provisions. 
It is important to note that firms should acknowledge that there are aspects of managerial 
ability that seem to be more effective in hard economic times and, as such, general managerial 
skills should be taken into consideration heavily when hiring CEOs.  
In this study, we are mostly interested in investigating the role of managerial ability 
in mitigating or exacerbating the impact of the crisis on the scale of corporate investment. Our 
setting recognizes that inferences may be confounded as variation in managerial ability and 
corporate decision-making are endogenous to unobserved variation in investment 
opportunities. To address this issue, our analysis employs data from the fiscal year 2008 to 
take advantage of the natural experiment conditions enabled by the negative liquidity shock 
and the deteriorating product demand observed during the financial crisis. However, our 
empirical findings and implications remain agnostic as to whether the positive effect of 
managerial ability on corporate investment, financial policies and firm value is also present 
during normal times or when such negative shocks are temporary. Despite this limitation, we 
remark that our results are fully consistent with market-based theories which predict that 
differences in managerial ability should relate to corporate decision-making and lead to 
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potentially large differences in firm valuation (e.g., Murphy and Zabojnik, 2004; Graham et 
al., 2013; Custodio et al., 2013, Falato et al., 2015). 
Finally, this study is the first one that empirically examines the relationship between 
managerial ability and corporate policies during the financial crisis period. Thus, future 
studies can examine other attributes based on demographics, human or social capital of the 
managers or even the board, which may also be informative regarding how and why certain 
types of firms attempt to alleviate underinvestment problems during periods of financing 
shortage. For instance, managerial prestige may interact with the ability to facilitate access to 
financing; likewise, politically-connected managers or boards with directors linked to 
financial institutions may have a more favorable treatment by lenders.   
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Appendix 
 
Definitions of the Variables 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent Variables 
 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
 
Capital expenditures (Compustat item: CAPX) in fiscal 
year 2008 divided by beginning of the year net assets 
(Compustat item: SEQ).  
  
CRISIS_CF Operating income before depreciation (Compustat item: 
OIBDP) in fiscal year 2008 divided by beginning of the 
year net assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
 
CRISIS_RESOURCES Issuance of long term debt (Compustat item: DLTIS) 
minus reduction of long term debt (Compustat item: 
DLTR) plus operating activities (Compustat item: 
OANCF) in fiscal year 2008 divided by beginning of the 
year net assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
  
CRISIS_FINCON A financial constraints measure estimated as in Whited 
and Wu (2006) for fiscal year 2008. 
  
CRISIS_Q Market equity (Compustat items: CSHO * PRCC_F) 
plus total debt (Compustat items: DLC + DLTT) plus  
preferred stock liquidating value (Compustat item: 
PSTKL) minus deferred taxes and investment tax credits 
(Compustat item: TXDITC ) all divided by book assets 
(Compustat item: AT).  
  
Managerial Variables 
 
 
RES_EFF_2006 Residual efficiency resulting from a Tobit regression in 
the spirit of Demerjian et al. (2012) that regresses firm 
efficiency score on a set of industry and firm-specific 
variables (see, RES_EFF term in Eq. (2)). This measure is 
estimated using data from fiscal year 2006. 
  
RES_EFF_AV Residual efficiency resulting from a Tobit regression in 
the spirit of Demerjian et al. (2012) that regresses firm 
efficiency score on a set of industry and firm-specific 
variables (see, RES_EFF term in Eq. (2)). This measure 
is estimated using the average residual efficiency, per 
firm, across the fiscal years 2002-2006. 
   
MA Assigned a value between 0 and 9 according to the decile 
ranking of RES_EFF_2006. 
  
MA_AV Assigned a value between 0 and 9 according to the decile 
ranking of RES_EFF_AV.   
  
GA General ability index in the spirit of Custodio et al. 
(2013). It summarizes information on CEOs skills and 
allows the classification among generalists and 
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specialists. 
Control Variables 
 
SIZE Natural logarithm of the firm’s market value of equity 
(Compustat items: CSHO 
*
 PRCC_F) in the end of fiscal 
year 2006. 
  
MTB The firm’s market value (Compustat items: CSHO * 
PRCC_F) divided by book value of equity (Compustat 
item: CEQ) in the end of fiscal year 2006. 
 
LEV Book value of debt (Compustat items: DLC + DLTT) 
divided by book value of total assets (Compustat items: 
DLC + DLTT + CEQ) in the end of fiscal year 2006. 
  
GROWTH The difference from 2005 to 2006 in total assets 
(Compustat item: AT) divided by the year 2005 total 
assets. 
  
RET The 12-month compounded stock return (excluding 
dividends) spanning the fiscal year 2006 (database: 
CRSP). 
 
ROE Earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat item: 
EBIT) in the end of fiscal year 2006 deflated by 
beginning of the year net assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
  
CF Operating income before depreciation (Compustat item: 
OIBDP) at the end of fiscal year 2006 divided by 
beginning of the year net assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
 
FINCON A financial constraints measure estimated as in Whited 
and Wu (2006) for fiscal year 2006. 
  
RESOURCES Issuance of long term debt (Compustat item: DLTIS) 
minus reduction of long term debt (Compustat item: 
DLTR) plus operating activities (Compustat item: 
OANCF) in fiscal year 2006 deflated by beginning of the 
year net assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
  
INVESTMENT Capital expenditures (Compustat item: CAPX) in the 
fiscal year 2006 divided by beginning of the year net 
assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
 
NUM_ANAL 
 
The natural logarithm of 1 plus the number of analysts 
covering the firm in the end of fiscal year 2006. 
 
RET_STD Standard deviation of daily returns spanning the fiscal 
year 2006 (database: CRSP). 
 
GIM The index constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) for year 
2006 (Andrew Metric’s website).   
  
BOARD_SIZE The number of members in a firm’s board of directors 
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(database: Boardex). 
  
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE The percentage of outside directors in a firm’s board of 
directors (database: BoardEx). 
  
INC_STOCKS The CEO stock holdings incentives ratio estimated as in 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) (database: 
Execucomp). 
  
INC_OPTIONS The CEO option holdings incentives ratio estimated as in 
Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) (database: 
Execucomp). 
CEO_AGE The natural logarithm of the CEO age (database: 
Execucomp). 
  
CEO_TENURE The natural logarithm of the number of years in the CEO 
position (database: Execucomp). 
  
CEO_DUALITY A binary variable that equals 1 when the positions of the 
CEO and the chairman of the board are held by the same 
person, and 0 otherwise (database: Execucomp). 
 
CEO_EDU A categorical variable that takes the value of 0 when the 
CEO has no university education, the value of 1 when 
the CEO has a bachelor degree, the value of 2 when the 
CEO also holds a master degree and a value of 3 when 
the CEO holds a PhD degree (database: BoardEx). 
 
RD Research and development expense (Compustat item: 
XRD) in the fiscal year 2006 divided by beginning of the 
year net assets (Compustat item: SEQ). 
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Table 1 
Summary statistics  
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables, managerial ability and 
main control variables using a sample of 2,583 observations with available information for all 
tabulated variables. All variables are defined in the Appendix. 
 
  Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
 
Dependent Variables      
CRISIS_INVESTMENT  0.140 0.063 0.258  
CRISIS_CF  0.209 0.206 0.562  
CRISIS_RESOURCES  0.196 0.158 0.510  
CRISIS_FINCON  -0.171 -0.197 0.187  
CRISIS_Q  2.617 2.355 6.872  
Main Independent  Variables    
RES_EFF_2006  -0.005 -0.042 0.257  
RES_EFF_AV  -0.017 -0.065 0.263  
Main Control  Variables    
SIZE  6.435 6.351 2.025  
MTB  3.289 2.429 4.003  
LEV  0.259 0.189 0.285  
GROWTH  0.190 0.092 0.413  
RET  0.228 0.092 0.784  
ROE  0.128 0.165 0.508  
CF  0.215 0.252 0.598  
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Table 2 
Managerial ability and investments 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on 
investments during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). Model (1) includes the 
managerial ability measure, MA, whereas model (2) includes the managerial ability measure 
MA_AV. CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal year 2008 while the managerial 
ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 2006. All 
regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated 
by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
Main Independent  Variables (1)  (2) 
MA  0.010*                               
(0.006) 
  
 
MA_AV    0.012**                                        
(0.006) 
 
SIZE  0.041**                               
(0.018) 
 0.042**                                                       
(0.018) 
 
MTB  0.115***                                
(0.017) 
 0.116***                                             
(0.017) 
 
LEV  0.176***                                         
(0.018) 
 0.176***                                              
(0.018) 
 
GROWTH  0.004                                 
(0.017) 
 0.004                                            
(0.017) 
 
RET  0.021                                            
(0.017) 
 0.022                                        
(0.017) 
 
CF  0.011                                
(0.018) 
 0.011                                              
(0.018) 
 
No. of Firms  2,748  2,748  
R2  0.262  0.262  
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Table 3 
Propensity score matching 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments 
during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) using propensity score matched samples. Panels A 
and C display for each control variable in Table 2 the difference-in-means between the high and low 
pre-crisis managerial ability subsamples (MA and MA_AV, respectively) together with the 
corresponding t-statistics. The unmatched sample corresponds to the original sample. The matched 
samples are the samples based on pre-crisis managerial ability propensity score matching. Panels B 
and D present coefficient estimates of specifications (1) and (2) of Table 2 (for MA and MA_AV, 
respectively) using the matched samples. CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal year 
2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal 
year 2006. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is 
designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.    
PANEL A: Difference-in-means of control variables between High Managerial Ability and Low 
Managerial Ability (based on the median value of MA) 
 Unmatched sample  Matched sample 
 Difference-in-means t-stat          Difference-in-means         t-stat 
SIZE 0.078**       2.04 -0.052 -1.35 
MTB 0.008       0.22 -0.016 -0.53 
LEV 0.017 0.44 0.054 1.50 
GROWTH -0.030 -0.80 0.016 0.43 
RET -0.033 -0.86 0.016 0.47 
CF -0.188*** -4.94 -0.031 -1.38 
     
Observations     
Total sample 2,748  2,488  
High MA  1,374  1,244  
Low MA 1,374  1,244  
PANEL B: Managerial Ability (MA) and investments: Matched Sample 
MA 
 
 0.010*                                
(0.006) 
SIZE 
  
3.578**                  
(1.471) 
 
MTB 
  
0.575***                                                
(0.188) 
LEV 
  
0.718***                       
(0.219)  
GROWTH 
  
-0.660**                  
(0.277)  
RET 
  
-0.859**                          
(0.367)  
CF 
  
-6.170**                           
(2.565)  
No of Firms   2,488  
R
2
   0.665  
PANEL C: Difference-in-means of control variables between High Managerial Ability and Low 
Managerial Ability (based on the median of MA_AV) 
 Unmatched sample Matched sample 
 Difference-in-means t-stat Difference-in-means      t-stat 
SIZE 0.058 1.53 -0.042 -1.12 
MTB 0.038 1.00 0.011 0.31 
LEV 0.020 0.52 0.004 0.11 
GROWTH -0.018 -0.47 0.018 0.46 
RET 0.012 0.31 0.036 0.97 
CF -0.160***    -4.21 -0.016 -0.44 
     
Observations     
Total sample            2,748  2,728  
High MA             1,374  1,364  
Low MA            1,374  1,364  
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PANEL D: Managerial Ability (MA_AV) and investments: Matched Sample 
MA_AV 
 
 0.018***                  
(0.006) 
 
SIZE 
  
0.137***             
(0.032) 
 
MTB 
  
0.095***                     
(0.027) 
 
LEV 
  
0.146***                
(0.026) 
 
GROWTH 
 
 0.031                   
(0.025) 
 
RET 
 
 0.041*                    
(0.025) 
 
CF 
 
 -0.047                   
(0.036) 
 
No of Firms   2,728  
R
2
   0.625  
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Table 4 
Managerial ability and investments: Additional control variables 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments 
during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the 
fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during 
the fiscal year 2006. Panel A display results using the managerial ability measure MA. Model (1) 
includes corporate governance variables as additional controls. Model (2) includes CEO-level 
controls. Model (3) includes both corporate governance and CEO-level controls. Panel B displays 
similar estimations using the managerial ability measure MA_AV. All regressions include a constant 
and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 
10%.     
 CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
PANEL A (1) (2)  (3) 
MA 0.027***         
(0.010) 
0.014*        
(0.009) 
0.028***     
(0.010) 
SIZE -0.035         
(0.056) 
0.008               
(0.035) 
-0.028              
(0.057) 
MTB 0.061*          
(0.036) 
0.051               
(0.031) 
0.051                     
(0.036) 
LEV 0.255***      
(0.035) 
0.219***           
(0.028) 
0.256***      
(0.035) 
GROWTH -0.031        
(0.040) 
0.009          
(0.033) 
-0.036        
(0.040) 
RET 0.181***        
(0.051) 
0.098***             
(0.036) 
0.184***         
(0.051) 
CF 0.030                 
(0.041) 
0.121***         
(0.034) 
0.034            
(0.040) 
GIM -0.014 
(0.012) 
 -0.011        
(0.012) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.0289 
(0.036) 
 0.045          
(0.036) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.007  
(0.030) 
 0.006              
(0.030) 
INC_STOCKS 0.075** 
(0.030) 
 0.079**       
(0.033) 
INC_OPTIONS 0.019  
(0.034) 
 0.016           
(0.035) 
CEO_AGE  -0.091***       
(0.028) 
-0.108***        
(0.033) 
CEO_TENURE  0.051*         
(0.028) 
0.047                
(0.036) 
CEO_DUALITY  0.0192            
(0.052) 
-0.060             
(0.062) 
No of Firms 844 1,090 844 
R2 0.317 0.292 0.329 
PANEL B (1) (2)  (3) 
MA_AV 0.026***       
(0.010) 
0.014*       
(0.008) 
0.027***    
(0.010) 
SIZE -0.036         
(0.056) 
0.007              
(0.035) 
-0.029       
(0.057) 
MTB 0.062*         
(0.036) 
0.051*            
(0.031) 
0.052      
(0.036) 
LEV 0.255          
(0.035) 
0.219***         
(0.028) 
0.256*** 
(0.035) 
GROWTH -0.029           
(0.040) 
0.009               
(0.033) 
-0.034      
(0.040) 
RET 0.184***         
(0.051) 
0.100***          
(0.036) 
0.187*** 
(0.051) 
CF 0.028          
(0.041) 
0.014          
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.010) 
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GIM 0.013          
(0.012) 
 0.031               
(0.040) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.030     
(0.036) 
 -0.011              
(0.012) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.007         
(0.030) 
 0.045          
(0.036) 
INC_STOCKS 0.076** 
(0.030) 
 0.005          
(0.030) 
INC_OPTIONS 0.019     
(0.034) 
 0.080**          
(0.033) 
CEO_AGE  -0.091*** 
(0.028) 
0.017           
(0.035) 
CEO_TENURE  0.051*      
(0.028) 
-0.109*** 
(0.033) 
CEO_DUALITY  0.021         
(0.052) 
0.047          
(0.036) 
No of Firms 844 1,090 844 
R2 0.317 0.292 0.328 
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Table 5 
Managerial ability and investments: Specialists versus generalists  
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments 
during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the 
fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during 
the fiscal year 2006. The sample consists of firms with available information for the general ability 
index developed by Custodio et al. (2013). Panels A and B display results using the managerial ability 
measures MA and MA_AV, respectively. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. 
Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.     
    
  
 CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
 ALL SPECIALISTS GENERALISTS 
PANEL A (1) (2) (3) 
    
MA 0.020**           
(0.009) 
0.001         
(0.012) 
0.035***        
(0.013) 
SIZE -0.006            
(0.035) 
-0.052       
(0.052) 
0.033         
(0.048) 
MTB 0.091***  
(0.033) 
0.358***          
(0.056) 
-0.040         
(0.041) 
LEV 0.228***  
(0.029) 
0.278***         
(0.045) 
0.169***        
(0.039) 
GROWTH -0.018      
(0.036) 
0.031        
(0.053) 
-0.051       
(0.048) 
RET 0.107***  
(0.037) 
0.050        
(0.054) 
0.173***           
(0.050) 
CF 0.129***  
(0.036) 
-0.071      
(0.063) 
0.152***         
(0.046) 
No of firms 1,029 511 518 
R² 0.279 0.433 0.254 
PANEL B (1) (2) (3) 
    
MA_AV 0.019**          
(0.009) 
-0.004      
(0.012) 
0.033**         
(0.013) 
SIZE -0.007       
(0.035) 
-0.054          
(0.052) 
0.031           
(0.048) 
MTB 0.091***  
(0.033) 
0.360***     
(0.056) 
-0.040       
(0.041) 
LEV 0.228***  
(0.029) 
0.276***     
(0.045) 
0.168***         
(0.039) 
GROWTH -0.017         
(0.036) 
0.032       
(0.053) 
-0.049          
(0.048) 
RET 0.109***  
(0.037) 
0.049           
(0.054) 
0.179***         
(0.050) 
CF 0.128***  
(0.036) 
-0.073           
(0.063) 
0.153***        
(0.046) 
No of firms 1,029 511 518 
R² 0.278 0.433 0.253 
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Table 6 
Specialists versus generalists and investments: Additional controls 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments 
during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the 
fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during 
the fiscal year 2006. Models (1)-(3) use firm-years where the CEO is classified as specialist while 
models (4)-(6) use firm-years where the CEO is classified as generalist. Model (1) includes corporate 
governance variables. Model (2) includes CEO-level controls. Model (3) includes both corporate 
governance and CEO-level controls. Panels A and B display results using the managerial ability 
measures MA and MA_AV, respectively. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. 
Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.     
 CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
 SPECIALISTS  GENERALISTS 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
        
MA 0.011                    
(0.014) 
-0.001 
(0.014) 
0.016  
(0.016) 
0.047*** 
(0.014) 
0.046*** 
(0.015) 
0.049*** 
(0.015) 
SIZE -0.012         
(0.082) 
0.017  
(0.061) 
0.028   
(0.093) 
-0.035    
(0.076) 
0.010     
(0.052) 
-0.047 
(0.082) 
MTB 0.350*** 
(0.067) 
0.283*** 
(0.062) 
0.367*** 
(0.071) 
-0.061   
(0.045) 
-0.089* 
(0.046) 
-0.071 
(0.047) 
LEV 0.377*** 
(0.055) 
0.318*** 
(0.051) 
0.395*** 
(0.060) 
0.168*** 
(0.048) 
0.212    
(0.044) 
0.171*** 
(0.051) 
GROWTH 0.077 
(0.073) 
0.052  
(0.061) 
0.105  
(0.087) 
-0.084*  
(0.049) 
-0.066             
(0.050) 
-0.090* 
(0.051) 
RET -0.009 
(0.069) 
-0.002 
(0.059) 
0.008  
(0.075) 
0.354*** 
(0.076) 
0.166*** 
(0.053) 
0.361*** 
(0.078) 
CF -0.289*** 
(0.078) 
-0.130* 
(0.070) 
-0.331*** 
(0.082) 
0.062    
(0.050) 
0.175*** 
(0.049) 
0.067  
(0.052) 
GIM -0.025 
(0.017) 
 -0.021 
(0.018) 
-0.000    
(0.017) 
 0.001  
(0.018) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.006 
(0.051) 
 0.040  
(0.059) 
0.030    
(0.050) 
 0.039  
(0.053) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.010 
(0.041) 
 0.026  
(0.047) 
0.030          
(0.044) 
 0.028  
(0.051) 
INC_STOCKS 0.149 
(0.186) 
 0.092  
(0.229) 
0.374        
(0.232) 
 0.466* 
(0.256) 
INC_OPTIONS -0.043 
(0.259) 
 -0.012 
(0.292) 
0.278             
(0.261) 
 0.321  
(0.278) 
CEO_AGE  -0.114** 
(0.045) 
-0.180*** 
(0.052) 
 -0.063   
(0.050) 
-0.051 
(0.054) 
CEO_TENURE  0.097** 
(0.044) 
0.159*** 
(0.058) 
 0.044     
(0.050) 
-0.012 
(0.060) 
CEO_DUALITY  -0.084   
(0.089) 
-0.102 
(0.103) 
 0.033       
(0.085) 
-0.056 
(0.091) 
CEO_EDU  -0.106** 
(0.051) 
-0.186*** 
(0.059) 
 0.061             
(0.051) 
0.071  
(0.054) 
No of firms 392 416 342 425 461 400 
R² 0.447 0.446 0.487 0.326 0.278 0.331 
        
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
        
MA_AV 0.005 
(0.014) 
-0.003 
(0.014) 
0.010     
(0.016) 
0.048*** 
(0.014) 
0.044*** 
(0.014) 
0.052*** 
(0.015) 
SIZE -0.011       
(0.083) 
0.016  
(0.062) 
0.030  
(0.093) 
-0.039   
(0.076) 
0.007           
(0.052) 
-0.052 
(0.082) 
MTB 0.353*** 
(0.067) 
0.284*** 
(0.062) 
0.369*** 
(0.071) 
-0.057   
(0.045) 
-0.086*  
(0.046) 
-0.067 
(0.047) 
LEV 0.376*** 
(0.055) 
0.317*** 
(0.051) 
0.395*** 
(0.060) 
0.166*** 
(0.048) 
0.210*** 
(0.044) 
0.167*** 
(0.051) 
45 
 
GROWTH 0.079        
(0.073) 
0.052  
(0.061) 
0.108   
(0.087) 
-0.083*  
(0.049) 
-0.064           
(0.050) 
-0.089* 
(0.0505) 
RET -0.011           
(0.070) 
-0.003 
(0.059) 
0.005  
(0.076) 
0.362*** 
(0.076) 
0.174*** 
(0.053) 
0.369*** 
(0.078) 
CF -0.292*** 
(0.078) 
-0.130* 
(0.070) 
-0.335 
(0.082) 
0.060    
(0.050) 
0.175*** 
(0.049) 
0.063   
(0.052) 
GIM -0.024        
(0.017) 
 -0.020 
(0.018) 
0.001    
(0.017) 
 0.003  
(0.018) 
BOARD_SIZE 0.004           
(0.051) 
 0.039 
(0.059) 
0.036    
(0.050) 
 0.045  
(0.053) 
BOARD_INDEP 0.009            
(0.041) 
 0.025 
(0.048) 
0.029    
(0.044) 
 0.026  
(0.051) 
INC_STOCKS 0.155           
(0.186) 
 0.096 
(0.229) 
0.374    
(0.231) 
 0.472* 
(0.255) 
INC_OPTIONS -0.055         
(0.259) 
 -0.029    
(0.291) 
0.300    
(0.261) 
 0.350     
(0.277) 
CEO_AGE  -0.115** 
(0.045) 
-
0.180*** 
(0.053) 
 -0.060   
(0.050) 
-0.050 
(0.054) 
CEO_TENURE  0.097** 
(0.044) 
0.160*** 
(0.058) 
 0.042        
(0.050) 
-0.014        
(0.060) 
CEO_DUALITY  -0.084 
(0.089) 
-0.100 
(0.103) 
 0.040       
(0.085) 
-0.053    
(0.090) 
CEO_EDU  -0.106** 
(0.051) 
-0.185*** 
(0.059) 
 0.066       
(0.052) 
0.075        
(0.054) 
No of firms 392 416 342 425 461 400 
R² 0.447 0.446 0.485 0.329 0.278 0.335 
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Table 7 
Specialist versus generalists and investments: Alternative measures 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on investments during the crisis period (CRISIS_INVESTMENT). 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT is measured during the fiscal year 2008 while the managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal 
year 2006. Panel A display results using the managerial ability measure MA. Models (1)-(3) and (7)-(8) use firms where the CEO is classified as specialist 
(CEO holds a PhD and CEO with specific education, respectively) while models (4)-(6) and (10)-(12) use firms where the CEO is classified as generalist 
(CEO does not hold a PhD and CEO with MBA and/or CPA, respectively). In addition, models (1), (4), (7) and (10) include corporate governance variables 
as additional controls. Models (2), (5), (8) and (11) include CEO-level controls. Models (3), (6), (9) and (12) include corporate governance and CEO-level 
controls. Panel B displays similar estimations using the managerial ability measure MA_AV. All regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. 
Statistical significance is designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.     
 
CRISIS_INVESTMENT 
                                  SPECIALISTS 
                                  (CEO holds a PhD) 
GENERALISTS 
(CEO does not hold a PhD) 
SPECIALISTS 
(CEO with  specific education) 
GENERALISTS 
(CEO with  MBA and/or CPA ) 
 Panel A                         (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
             
MA 
0.017              
(0.036) 
0.012  
(0.026) 
0.021  
(0.037) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.024** 
(0.010) 
0.031*** 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.012) 
0.044** 
(0.019) 
0.038** 
(0.016) 
0.042** 
(0.019) 
SIZE 
-0.450*** 
(0.168) 
-0.080 
(0.096) 
-0.480*** 
(0.176) 
0.017        
(0.065) 
0.018  
(0.042) 
0.031  
(0.066) 
0.031 
(0.063) 
0.018 
(0.044) 
0.021 
(0.067) 
-0.102 
(0.107) 
-0.000 
(0.064) 
-0.070 
(0.111) 
MTB 
-0.020       
(0.146) 
-0.034 
(0.104) 
-0.035 
(0.152) 
0.064        
(0.040) 
0.045  
(0.036) 
0.053  
(0.040) 
-0.087** 
(0.043) 
-0.060 
(0.040) 
-0.080** 
(0.043) 
0.172*** 
(0.064) 
0.141** 
(0.056) 
0.165** 
(0.064) 
LEV 
0.312*** 
(0.117) 
0.333*** 
(0.090) 
0.319** 
(0.122) 
0.274*** 
(0.040) 
0.254*** 
(0.034) 
0.275  
(0.040) 
0.212 
(0.043) 
0.181 
(0.036) 
0.218*** 
(0.043) 
0.362 
(0.066) 
0.388 
(0.054) 
0.357 
(0.067) 
GROWTH 
0.029         
(0.089) 
0.009  
(0.077) 
0.024  
(0.091) 
-0.033      
(0.049) 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.039 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.032 
(0.039) 
-0.040 
(0.047) 
-0.038 
(0.078) 
-0.014 
(0.067) 
-0.036 
(0.079) 
RET 
-0.072            
(0.214) 
-0.076 
(0.174) 
-0.108 
(0.225) 
0.169*** 
(0.057) 
0.096** 
(0.040) 
0.180*** 
(0.057) 
0.118 
(0.079) 
0.038 
(0.047) 
0.113 
(0.079) 
0.147* 
(0.080) 
0.126** 
(0.062) 
0.157* 
(0.081) 
CF 
0.192          
(0.224) 
0.129           
(0.115) 
0.246  
(0.239) 
0.012        
(0.044) 
0.119*** 
(0.040) 
0.014  
(0.044) 
0.107* 
(0.058) 
0.278*** 
(0.049) 
0.118** 
(0.058) 
-0.060 
(0.065) 
-0.052 
(0.058) 
-0.060 
(0.065) 
GIM 
0.055        
(0.034) 
 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
-0.013      
(0.014) 
 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
 
-0.007 
(0.023) 
BOARD_SIZE 
0.286*** 
(0.090) 
 
0.296*** 
(0.100) 
-0.026       
(0.043) 
 
-0.009 
(0.043) 
0.004 
(0.044) 
 
0.018 
(0.045) 
0.066 
(0.066) 
 
0.075 
(0.066) 
BOARD_INDEP 
-0.036       
(0.083) 
 
-0.017 
(0.088) 
0.021        
(0.036) 
 
0.027  
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.036) 
 
0.048 
(0.037) 
-0.029 
(0.060) 
 
-0.021 
(0.062) 
INC_STOCKS 
0.393              
(0.367) 
 
0.469  
(0.437) 
0.357**     
(0.167) 
 
0.355** 
(0.180) 
0.259* 
(0.150) 
 
0.348** 
(0.168) 
0.382 
(0.309) 
 
0.309 
(0.329) 
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INC_OPTIONS 
1.294*** 
(0.475) 
 
1.341*** 
(0.488) 
0.034        
(0.213) 
 
0.026  
(0.215) 
0.249 
(0.198) 
 
0.280 
(0.199) 
0.018 
(0.366) 
 
-0.096 
(0.373) 
CEO_AGE  
-0.043 
(0.084) 
0.008                        
(0.106) 
 
-0.098*** 
(0.035) 
-0.103*** 
(0.039) 
 
-0.069* 
(0.037) 
-0.069* 
(0.040) 
 
-0.073 
(0.053) 
-0.100 
(0.064) 
CEO_TENURE  
0.024  
(0.066) 
-0.006 
(0.096) 
 
0.073** 
(0.034) 
0.063  
(0.043) 
 
0.026 
(0.034) 
0.000 
(0.040) 
 
0.125** 
(0.055) 
0.117 
(0.074) 
CEO_DUALITY  
0.122  
(0.151) 
-0.167 
(0.189) 
 
-0.024 
(0.062) 
-0.092 
(0.071) 
 
0.008 
(0.067) 
-0.094 
(0.070) 
 
-0.039 
(0.096) 
-0.047 
(0.122) 
No of firms                      97  125 97 672 826 672 398 505 398 371 446 371 
R²                                     0.627  0.500 0.632 0.311 0.285 0.322 0.410 0.346 0.422 0.333 0.340 0.341 
Panel B                           (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
             
MA_AV 
0.016       
(0.035) 
0.007  
(0.026) 
0.017  
(0.036) 
0.030***      
(0.011) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.030*** 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
0.037** 
(0.019) 
0.030** 
(0.015) 
0.035* 
(0.019) 
SIZE 
-0.447**  
(0.171) 
-0.085 
(0.096) 
-0.480*** 
(0.179) 
0.015             
(0.065) 
0.018  
(0.042) 
0.030  
(0.066) 
0.032 
(0.062) 
0.020 
(0.044) 
0.022 
(0.064) 
-0.102 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.064) 
-0.071 
(0.111) 
MTB 
-0.012       
(0.140) 
-0.027 
(0.103) 
-0.020 
(0.144) 
0.065             
(0.040) 
0.045  
(0.036) 
0.054  
(0.040) 
-0.086** 
(0.043) 
-0.061 
(0.040) 
-0.093** 
(0.043) 
0.176*** 
(0.064) 
0.145*** 
(0.056) 
0.168*** 
(0.064) 
LEV 
0.315*** 
(0.117) 
0.332*** 
(0.090) 
0.324*** 
(0.121) 
0.273*** 
(0.040) 
0.256*** 
(0.034) 
0.274*** 
(0.040) 
0.212*** 
(0.043) 
0.182*** 
(0.036) 
0.218 
(0.043) 
0.361*** 
(0.067) 
0.387*** 
(0.054) 
0.356*** 
(0.067) 
GROWTH 
0.031         
(0.088) 
0.012  
(0.077) 
0.027  
(0.091) 
-0.032       
(0.049) 
-0.036 
(0.040) 
-0.038 
(0.049) 
-0.032 
(0.047) 
-0.033 
(0.039) 
-0.041 
(0.047) 
-0.033 
(0.079) 
-0.010 
(0.067) 
-0.030 
(0.079) 
RET 
-0.077      
(0.212) 
-0.080 
(0.174) 
-0.115 
(0.224) 
0.172*** 
(0.057) 
0.099** 
(0.040) 
0.183*** 
(0.057) 
0.118 
(0.079) 
0.040 
(0.047) 
0.113 
(0.079) 
0.153* 
(0.081) 
0.130** 
(0.062) 
0.162** 
(0.081) 
CF 
0.178         
(0.219) 
0.127  
(0.115) 
0.222  
(0.231) 
0.009        
(0.044) 
0.118*** 
(0.040) 
0.011  
(0.044) 
0.105* 
(0.058) 
0.277*** 
(0.049) 
0.116** 
(0.058) 
-0.066 
(0.065) 
-0.058 
(0.058) 
-0.065 
(0.065) 
GIM 
0.056*  
(0.034) 
 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
-0.013       
(0.014) 
 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
-0.021 
(0.014) 
 
-0.020 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.023) 
 
-0.005 
(0.023) 
BOARD_SIZE 
0.285*** 
(0.091) 
 
0.293*** 
(0.098) 
-0.024       
(0.043) 
 
-0.007 
(0.043) 
0.005 
(0.044) 
 
0.019 
(0.045) 
0.071 
(0.066) 
 
0.080 
(0.066) 
BOARD_INDEP 
-0.037  
(0.084) 
 
-0.017 
(0.089) 
0.022 
(0.036) 
 
0.027  
(0.037) 
0.041 
(0.035) 
 
0.048 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.060) 
 
-0.020 
(0.062) 
INC_STOCKS 
0.398  
(0.366) 
 
0.479   
(0.436) 
0.361**          
(0.167) 
 
0.358** 
(0.180) 
0.257* 
(0.150) 
 
0.344** 
(0.168) 
0.419 
(0.308) 
 
0.350 
(0.328) 
INC_OPTIONS 
1.301*** 
(0.473) 
 
1.354*** 
(0.487) 
0.035           
(0.213) 
 
0.027  
(0.215) 
0.253 
(0.198) 
 
0.283 
(0.199) 
-0.008 
(0.366) 
 
-0.119 
(0.373) 
CEO_AGE  
-0.042 
(0.084) 
0.016 
(0.106) 
 
-0.098*** 
(0.035) 
-0.105*** 
(0.039) 
 
-0.067* 
(0.037) 
-0.068* 
(0.040) 
 
-0.076 
(0.053) 
-0.106* 
(0.064) 
CEO_TENURE  
0.024  
(0.066) 
-0.010 
(0.096) 
 
0.073** 
(0.034) 
0.064  
(0.043) 
 
0.025 
(0.034) 
0.001 
(0.040) 
 
0.123** 
(0.055) 
0.115 
(0.074) 
CEO_DUALITY  
0.124  
(0.151) 
-0.160 
(0.188) 
 
-0.022 
(0.062) 
-0.090 
(0.071) 
 
0.008 
(0.067) 
-0.094 
(0.070) 
 
-0.030 
(0.096) 
-0.040 
(0.122) 
No of firms                         97  125 97 672 826 672 398 505 398 371 446 371 
R²                                       0.627   0.500 0.632 0.311 0.286 0.322 0.411 0.347 0.422 0.331 0.337 0.339 
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Table 8 
Managerial ability and financing 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of pre-crisis managerial ability on financing during 
the crisis period. The financing variable in models (1) and (2) is the crisis period cash flow 
(CRISIS_CF), in models (3) and (4) is the crisis period total financing resources 
(CRISIS_RESOURCES) and in models (5) and (6) is the Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraints 
index (CRISIS_ FINCON). The financing variables are measured during the fiscal year 2008 while the 
managerial ability measures and the control variables are measured during the fiscal year 2006. Panels 
A and B display results using the managerial ability measures MA and MA_AV, respectively. All 
regressions include a constant and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is designated by 
‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.       
 
  CRISIS_CF CRISIS_RESOURCES  CRISIS_FINCON 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
0.018*** 
(0.007) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
SIZE 0.204*** 
(0.020) 
0.184*** 
(0.026) 
0.206*** 
(0.021) 
0.182*** 
(0.027) 
-0.049*** 
(0.008) 
-0.049*** 
(0.009) 
MTB 0.097*** 
(0.019) 
0.100*** 
(0.019) 
0.064*** 
(0.019) 
0.065*** 
(0.020) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
LEV 0.129*** 
(0.019) 
0.150*** 
(0.020) 
0.083*** 
(0.020) 
0.092*** 
(0.021) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
GROWTH -0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
-0.043** 
(0.020) 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
RET 0.009  
(0.018) 
0.020  
(0.020) 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.010** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
ROE 0.063   
(0.053) 
0.060  
(0.053) 
0.028  
(0.025) 
0.021 
(0.025) 
0.001  
(0.006) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
CF 0.111** 
(0.052) 
0.108** 
(0.053) 
    
RESOURCES   0.148*** 
(0.042) 
0.152*** 
(0.042) 
  
FINCON 
 
    0.915*** 
(0.009) 
0.923*** 
(0.009) 
NUM_ANAL  0.008  
(0.023) 
 -0.003 
(0.024) 
 0.002  
(0.006) 
RET_STD  -0.015 
(0.020) 
 -0.052** 
(0.022) 
 -0.004 
(0.006) 
 
No of firms 
2,748 2,689 2,529 2,471 2,695 2,642 
R² 0.168 0.171 0.147 0.149 0.937 0.939 
       
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
MA_AV 0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.018*** 
(0.006) 
0.017*** 
(0.007) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
-0.004** 
(0.002) 
SIZE 0.203*** 
(0.019) 
0.183*** 
(0.026) 
0.205*** 
(0.020) 
0.180*** 
(0.027) 
0.048*** 
(0.008) 
-0.048*** 
(0.009) 
MTB 0.098*** 
(0.019) 
0.101*** 
(0.019) 
0.065*** 
(0.019) 
0.067*** 
(0.020) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
LEV 0.129*** 
(0.019) 
0.150*** 
(0.020) 
0.083*** 
(0.020) 
0.092*** 
(0.021) 
-0.014*** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
GROWTH -0.033* 
(0.018) 
-0.033* 
(0.019) 
-0.042** 
(0.020) 
-0.037* 
(0.021) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
0.032*** 
(0.005) 
RET 0.011  
(0.018) 
0.020  
(0.020) 
-0.014    
(0.019) 
0.002 
(0.021) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.012** 
(0.005) 
ROE 0.063  
(0.053) 
0.060  
(0.053) 
0.030     
(0.025) 
0.024 
(0.025) 
0.000  
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
CF 0.112** 
(0.052) 
0.110** 
(0.053) 
    
RESOURCES 
 
  0.146*** 
(0.042) 
0.151*** 
(0.042) 
  
FINCON     0.915*** 0.922*** 
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(0.009) (0.009) 
NUM_ANAL 
 
 0.008        
(0.023) 
 -0.002 
(0.024) 
 0.002       
(0.006) 
RET_STD  -0.015     
(0.020) 
 -0.051** 
(0.022) 
 -0.004   
(0.006) 
No of firms 2,748 2,689 2,529 2,471 2,695 2,642 
R² 0.169 0.171 0.147 0.149 0.937 0.939 
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Table 9 
 Investments and firm value 
 
This table reports regression coefficient estimates of investment (CRISIS_INVESTMENT) on firm 
value (CRISIS_Q) during the crisis period. CRISIS_INVESTMENT and CRISIS_Q are measured 
during the fiscal year 2008. The remaining variables are controls and are measured during the fiscal 
year 2006. All regressions include constants and industry fixed effects. Statistical significance is 
designated by ‘***’ at 1%, ‘**’ at 5% and ‘*’ at 10%.   
 
   LOWMA HIGHMA 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
CRISIS_INVESTMENT 4.729*** 
(0.569) 
3.672*** 
(1.238) 
-5.149*** 
(1.805) 
7.230***  
(1.410) 
SIZE 0.226*** 
(0.076) 
0.354 
(0.231) 
0.875*** 
(0.288) 
-0.545* 
(0.297) 
MTB 0.079** 
(0.033) 
0.103 
(0.072) 
-0.207** 
(0.095) 
0.565  
(0.092) 
LEV -
2.119*** 
(0.530) 
-0.930 
(1.177) 
-0.649 
(1.458) 
2.370  
(1.549) 
GROWTH -0.104 
(0.233) 
-0.773 
(0.853) 
0.306  
(1.075) 
-2.482** 
(1.240) 
RD 
 
1.078** 
(0.483) 
2.325 
(1.868) 
-4.481* 
(2.690) 
6.747*** 
(2.030) 
INVESTMENT 
 
-0.026 
(0.059) 
0.603 
(0.742) 
2.862*** 
(1.055) 
-0.974 
(0.915) 
GIM  0.026 
(0.111) 
-0.437 
(1.776) 
-0.128 
(1.675) 
INC_STOCKS  -1.249 
(1.304) 
1.181  
(2.231) 
-0.541 
(2.253) 
INC_OPTIONS  0.502 
(1.724) 
-0.066 
(0.139) 
0.097  
(0.149) 
No of firms 2,866 914 503 411 
R² 0.052 0.071 0.061 0.199 
 
